

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

14 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SE-7: PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO THE
INCLUSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN
WESTERN DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the National Estimates Board pursuant to a consideration of it by the IAC representatives.

2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting for 14 June.

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Executive Secretary
(Acting)

Distribution "A"

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OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN WESTERN DEFENSE
AGREEMENTS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to (a) the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO; (b) the formation of a Mediterranean Defense Pact including Greece and Turkey, with the US as a member; and (c) security arrangements between Greece and Turkey and certain individual NAT nations, including the US.

ESTIMATE

1. We estimate that the Kremlin is unlikely to precipitate a general war because of the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any of the security agreements listed in ~~the~~ ^{the system of the} problem.

2. The Kremlin will almost certainly react to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any Western security agreement with intensified psychological warfare, various modes of

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political and economic pressure upon countries outside the Soviet orbit ~~and~~ (particularly upon the Near Eastern countries), diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, increased anti-Western propaganda, and threatening gestures.

3. We believe that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in a security pact which included the US would have little effect on the willingness of the Kremlin to accept greater risks of general war by local actions anywhere in the world in support of its policy objectives.

4. We believe that the Kremlin would regard the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any defense agreement which also includes the US, and particularly their inclusion in NATO, as an obstacle to Soviet expansion not only in the Near East but also in Europe, and as a potential threat to the security of the USSR. It is probable that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO or in a Mediterranean pact which included the US, Britain and France, would be regarded by the Kremlin as a more formidable obstacle to Soviet expansion and as a greater potential menace to the USSR than an agreement which did not include these Western European powers.

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5. We believe, furthermore, that since the US has publicly proposed that Greece and Turkey be admitted to NATO, a refusal by Britain or France to undertake firm security commitments to those countries would be interpreted by the Kremlin as revealing weakness and dissension among the members of the Western alliance. Such a development would to some extent make subsequent security commitments by the US to Greece and Turkey appear to the Kremlin less formidable.